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ORBITING SENTINELS FOR SECURITY
Lt. Col. Stanley G. Rosen
NOTE; THE OPINIONS CONTAINED IN THIS ARTICLE REPRESENT THE VIEWS
OF THE AUTHOR, AND DO NOT NESESSARILY REPRESENT THE POSITION OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

INTRODUCTION

For the past forty years, the threat of retaliation has been
the foundation of our national security strategy. This threat has
been the basis of the deterrent strategy which has helped maintain
a relatively peaceful relationship between the world's major
powers. However, this strategy has also led to an expensive and
possibly dangerous need to maintain large numbers of nuclear and
conventional weapons around the world.
These difficulties with retaliatory deterrence are the main
reason for many of the alternative strategies which are being
considered. One alternative is to move beyond threat in
structuring our national security posture. New technical and
political opportunities may now make promoting mutual security
rather than mutual threat a realistic means of protecting our
Interests.
The advent and political acceptance of on-site- and
space-based sensors and observers to verify compliance with arms
control agreements has opened a new era of global stability and
security. At the same time as nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles were being perfected, space-based observation systems
were also coming to maturity. On the other hand, the provision
for on-site observers to monitor treaty compliance on a large
scale is a relatively recent phenomenon in the U.S.-Soviet
relationship.
• First used to observe the earth's natural resources and to
monitor arms control agreements, space-based sensors have injected
new stability into international relationships. Orbiting sensors
which can see deeply and constantly Into the territory of all
nations can provide early warning of impending hostilities, 3y
being able to detect threats at their source, in the homeland of
•the potential aggressor, space sensors are helping make
large-scale surprise attack an artifact of the past. With
improved Information regarding a potential adversary's military
activities, military responses can be planned and executed, with
greater precision, avoiding much of the overreact ion which led to
inadvertant escalation In past conflicts. Finally, the existence
of'these sensor capabilities has acted to deter conflict: a
potential aggressor knows he is being watched.
The fact that space sensors can detect missile launches as
soon as they occur has formed the backbone of our current nuclear
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deterrent strategy since the 1960 f s. It is precisely because space
sensors can provide early warning of missile attack that the U.S.
and the Soviet Union can today credibly threaten retaliation
against any nuclear attacker. Without this early warning, the
threat of retaliation would be hollow. Adequate warning, based on
information from space, is the key to our current strategy of
nuclear deterrence.
At the same time as orbiting observation systems are
maturing, the growing political acceptability of on-site observers
on the ground also offers a powerful new tool for maintaining
confidence that threats are understood. When used in combination
with space-based observation systems, they provide a unique abilty
to detect and identify emerging threats, and' thereby discourage
the development of such threats in the first place.
Orbiting sensors can survey wide areas repeatedly, looking
for changes or other indicators that suspicious activity may be
occuring. They cannot, however, look into buildings or produce
detailed inspections of suspected weapon developments. These
latter steps can be performed by on-site observers, who themselves
must be cued by sensors which can survey broad areas repeatedly,
from orbit, On-site observers must use satellite communication
links to quickly and securely report their findings to their home
countries.
T.hese new information gathering and evaluation capabilities
offer to revolutionize the strategies by which nations maintain
their security. In the process, they may offer the first really
new concept for global stability in forty years.
BACKGROUND

Since the end of World War II, the United States and the
Soviet Union have maintained weapons of mass destruction whose
primary purpose is mutual threat. The unprecedented investment of
national wealth in systems for strategic warfare has produced a
massive stockpile of weapons and destructive capability never
before imagined. These weapons have successfully maintained a
relatively stable global environment for the past four decades,
based on their ability to deter conflict by threatening
unacceptable retaliation.
Unfortunately, this is a very expensive strategy, and one
that many feel we cannot afford. A credible deterrent requires
the ability to conduct warfare at whatever level is deemed
appropriate to the situation; thus the concept of "flexible
response." To conduct extended warfare as one escalates through
increasing levels of nuclear employment requires command, control,
and communications systems and the weapons they support to be
designed for unprecedented punishment. The morale and obedience of
the troops must be unquestionable if they are to provide a
credible nuclear warfighting force. Finally, there must be some
sort of economic infrastructure to support the country during such
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an extended conflict.
Our concept of strategic warfare also forms the backbone of
"extended deterrence 11 , a concept by which our global interests,
including the security of our allies, is "guaranteed" by the
threat that we can and will attack the Soviet Union, if adequately
provoked. Most specifically, this concept of extended deterrence
has come to underlie our commitment to the defense of our European
allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Extended deterrence promises to protect our European allies
by offering the possibility of nuclear response to an attack on
our allies. In the first order, nuclear weapons could be used to
blunt a conventional attack from the Warsaw Pact, if our
conventional forces could not do the job. The very possibility of
such a response has helped maintain deterrence in Europe. Of
course, this defense itself could bring unparalleled destruction
to the continent, and to the homelands of our allies in
particular. Thus, the strategy of nuclear defense of Europe
appears to contain the latent seeds of its own demise.
The next step in this strategy would be the launching of
nuclear weapons from the United States against the Soviet Union
itself, in an attempt to dissuade them from continued aggression
in Europe. That such action could lead directly to global nuclear
holocaust has been long and widely recognized.
It has even been postulated by various scientists that the
detonation of even a "few" nuclear weapons (on the order of a
hundred) could raise enough soot, ash and smoke into the
atmosphere to block the sun and dramatically lower the world's
temperature. Even though this theory has not been fully
substantiated, this possibility of "nuclear winter" adds to the
obvious question: what clash of interests between, the U.S. and the
Soviet Union could justify the destruction which would be caused
by; such, a conflict?
It is extremely hard to justify warfare which leads to such
outcomes, and both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R* know it. Nuclear
warfare cannot be won and should not be fought, in. the words of
former President Reagan* And. the concept of extended deterrence,
'whose credibility rests in turn on the credibility of a global
nuclear conflict, is being challenged. As a minimum, we would
prefer a situation in which our survival was under our own
control. For these reasons, strategies which seem to have worked
for four decades are being reexamined.
Of course, many believe that we could have no quarrel with
the Soviets that would conceivably justify using nuclear weapons
to destroy each other 1 s homeland. It is difficult to conceive of
a-situation in which rational men and. women would decide to
unleash the total destructive capacity now residing in our nuclear
arsenals* For very good reasons, neither side is likely to
intentionally initiate a nuclear conflict with the other.
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The problem is, of course, that men and women are not always
rational, nor are they always in control of events. That is one
of the sobering lessons of history. Therefore, the very existence
of these tens of thousands of nuclear weapons could be one of the
greatest real threats to the security of the world today.Accidents, miscalculations and other forms of unintended
catastrophe can happen.
These are only the most obvious issues which must be solved
if a credible deterrent is to rest on a strategy of flexible
response and protracted conflict. It is not surprising, then, that
this strategy has been met with a large degree of skepticism, at
both the professional and political levels, not to mention growing
concern about its validity by the public.
As a possible alternative security arrangement, it is not
hard to envision a set of international relationships in which all
major powers would at all times feel that their basic security was
protected. In the case of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, this
would mean that the primary reason for maintaining nuclear forces,
to deter attack on each other, would no longer exist. In such a
defense-dominant relationship, the threat to the homeland of each
country would be minimized.
If our allies were also confident that they, too, were much
less susceptable to rapid, devastating attack, the need to
maintain a policy of extended deterrence would be significantly
reduced.
A framework for mutual security, would rely more heavily on
defensive strategies which seek to protect rather than to
threaten. Therefore, such strategies are less likely to provoke
an "arms race" and lead to an endless quest to keep others under
threat.
Of course, even in a power balance more heavily characterized
by defenses, tactical offensive capabilities will still be needed,
as long as warfare is a possibility. The offense is a key element
of any military action, and such capabilities should not be
denied. However, the move to defensive strategies could reduce
the need for massive, swift-acting offensive forces, and, in the
process, could reduce the possibility of conflict.
At the same time, the move away from a large retaliatory
strategic force structure could allow our offensive forces to be
better focused toward tactical war-fighting needs, aimed at the
many and varied kinds of threats which will likely face the
military in the coming years.
The challenge, then, is to find a proper context for building
a security relationship which avoids the undesirable features of
the deterrent posture analyzed above. The "win-win" approach of
mutual security seems to offer one such possibility.
Once we have accepted the premise that we do not have to
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threaten a potential adversary to properly manage our side of the
relationship, then we can begin to consider ways to strengthen our
security without provoking others in the process.
This, then, is an alternative strategy to mutual deterrence
based on retaliation. It is a strategy which could lead to a real
reduction of tensions and to greater security for the world's
major powers, and, in turn, for the entire planet. It represents
a commitment to mutual security from imminent massive destruction
for all the world's people. In this context, a move toward a more
defense-oriented strategy makes sense.
INFORMATION FOR STABLE SECURITY

The objective of mutual security would be to create and
maintain a situation in which no world power possesses enough
destructive power to inflict unacceptable damage on another. To
arrive at such an arrangement would require all major powers to
recognize that mutual security is in fact in their common
interest.
The critical and often under-appreciated link in this
transition, however, is the need for information. To be mutually
secure, all nations must have confidence that their potential
adversary or adversaries do not possess the ability to overwhelm
their own organic defenses. To achieve this confidence, it is
essential that each country use available information gathering
capabilities to ensure itself that its potential adversary did
not, in fact, retain enough weapons to pose an unacceptable
threat. Verifiable confidence, not threat, then, would become the
basis for security.
In theater warfare such as Europe, space sensors will also be
the key to maintaining defenses which are not provocative. What we
call a European "theater" war is, of course, homeland or strategic
conflict to the Europeans. The same logic applies here as it does
to U.S./Soviet homeland warfare, except that the distances and,
therefore, attack times are much shorter. The goal is to establish
defenses which do not threaten the homeland of either side.
Clearly, in locations such as Western Europe, the possibility
exists to replace offensive weapons with more defensively oriented
ones. Although there is probably no such thing as a purely
"offensive" or "defensive" weapon, for the purposes of this
discussion offensive weapons are such systems as tanks, missiles,
and attack aircraft. Defensive weapons include anti-tank weapons,
mines and passive devices such as barriers. Use of more defensive
oriented weapons in Europe is a strategic concept which has been
thoroughly examined elsewhere.
Of course, since "offensive" weapons would be needed to
respond in case of attack, they must be available. The concern for
security arises when they are positioned so as to pose an
immediate threat to other nations, and must therefore be countered
by opposing deployments of the other side, creating the kind of

potential instabilty we are trying to avoid. Thus, a parameter of
interest in theater force deployments is not only the kind of
weapons used, but also their location.
Remembering that the objective of mutual security is to
reduce or eliminate the immediate threat to each country's
homeland, and thereby promote its sense of security, it appears
desirable that weapons capable of such an attack be removed from
the immediate vicinity of potential hostilities, so as not to pose
an immediate threat.
The answer to the long standing dilemma of how to provide
defenses which can respond quickly to a developing threat but do
not themselves pose an immediate threat to the other side is early
warning. This warning time is the primary requirement for
mobilizing or moving defenses into position, assuming that the
threatening forces were deployed well behind the threatened region
prior to their call-up.
Arms control regimes which move threatening forces away from
areas of immediate contention would therefore promote stability in
such•"theaters". Basing force structures on warning-oriented
strategies, where warning can be certain and accurate, would thus
help eliminate tensions in some of the most contested areas of the
planet.
Of course, weapons alone, offensive or defensive, cannot,
guarantee peace. Peace and stability can only be maintained by
methods which address the underlying issues which precipitate
conflict. Unless the diplomatic, humanitarian, political, social
and economic instruments of statehood are brought to bear on their
root causes, strife and conflict are inevitable. The best the
military can hope for is to create a situation which maintains a
stable peace long enough for other, non-violent methods of
resolving conflicts to be effective.
What we are finding is that the ability to provide such
information is developing rapidly, significantly improving our
opportunity to develop new security strategies. The options
described here would not have been possible only a few years ago;
the information gathering, dissemination and processing
capabilities these options require were not yet available. Now
they are, and the new strategic concepts they enable should be
identified and assessed.
INFORMATION SOURCES

For nations to rely on information f-or warning of emerging
threats, there must be a high degree of- confidence that the needed
information will be collected and interpreted correctly in a
timely manner. Many different types of sensors will be needed to
minimize the ambiguity of such data. The fact is that the world's
technical ability to deploy and exploit a wide variety of space
information gathering capabilities is undergoing revolutionary
change.
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Whereas, in the past, only a few countries had the ability to
conduct earth remote sensing from space, this ability is now
becoming commonplace. Once the exclusive province of the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R., such satellites are now flown by Japan, Europe,
Canada, India and China, with other entrants in the wings. Over
20 countries or international organizations plan to fly civil or
commercial remote sensing satellites in the 1990 f s.
Not only is the number of nations with satellite monitoring
capabilities increasing rapidly, but the technology to conduct
such activities is being revolutionized. Newer, more capable, and
more efficient devices to conduct remote sensing are being
developed around the world.
In addition, over the past few years, the capability to
sustain human observers in orbit has dramatically improved. Based
on the early U.S. and Soviet experimental flights, our
civilization is experiencing a dramatic step in the evolution of
humankind, as men and women learn to live in space. Technologies
represented by the U.S. Skylab and Space Shuttle and the Soviet
Buran shuttle and Salyut and Mir space stations will continue to
evolve as the permanent presence of humans in earth orbit becomes
a reality. Future capabilities, such as the international space
station program led by the U.S. and evolutionary developments of
the Soviet systems, will enable human observers to remain
productive in orbit for increasingly longer periods. With their
ability to observe large areas quickly, peer through holes between
clouds, and draw on fine visual acuity, observers in orbit may be
uniquely able to detect cues which can lead to more detailed
investigation by remote-sensing satellites or observers on the
ground.
Newly emerging potentials offer the possibility of being able
to rapidly and economically observe areas anywhere on earth from
space, with only minutes notice. Such short- or no-notice
inspection capability could go a long way toward providing
necessary confidence that no new threats were developing.
The great potential for information collection offered by
such orbiting sensors is one of the main reasons they are being
promoted as useful tools for understanding stresses to the global
environment and managing global resources. Satellite sensors may
also be a powerful tool for finding and interdicting drug traffic
into the United States. Sensor systems used to maintain military
stability would thus have significant ancillary peacetime benefit.
It is this rapid growth in the ability of the people of this
planet to observe themselves from a new perspective which gives
rise to the need to reexamine our concepts of how we organize
ourselves to face our common challenges. For it is not military
and traditional security considerations alone which will be
influenced by these new capabilities. The implications, the
effects, will be far-reaching indeed.
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CONCLUSION
The advent of space-based information collection and
dissemination systems has opened new possibilities for
restructuring international relations. Just as the creation of the
nuclear-tipped ballistic missile and the long range bomber ushered
in the era of defense by threat of nuclear retaliation, so has the
development of orbiting surveillance and communication systems
enhanced the possibility of security based on confidence. These
are our new sentinels.
We seem to be moving from a relatively brief period in
history in which satellite systems have been used to verify
constraints on or reduction of strategic arms to a period in which
such weapons may well be inappropriate for maintaining security —
a shift enabled by the capabilities of those same space-based
observation devices. Conventional threats in Europe and elsewhere
would be radically reduced as nations moved away from the threat
of rapid attack and ground- and space-based observers were
deployed to provide constant confirmation of mutual security.
.Is cooperation for mutual security possible? We know, for
example, that the Soviets have often offered to reduce or
eliminate weapons of various sorts, including missiles, space
weapons, and ground troops. Our main concern is that we cannot be
sure that they are sincere, or that such actions could be verified
or enforced. We worry about a world in which they do not keep
their agreements. These are valid concerns, of course.
Clearly, the rewards of an effective agreement would be
great. Such an ideal may seem a simplistic dream, but it is not
unrealistic to expect the nations of the world to act in ways
which further their self interest. In many ways, the proposals
presented here meet that criterion.

Security systems which promote communication, which add time
and information to strengthen diplomacy and other conflict
resolution approaches, and which in themselves create national
wealth are certainly systems worthy of consideration. Systems and
technologies which are conducive to solving political problems by
political means, and which encourage cooperation and dialog,
rather than systems which threaten, may indeed be most conducive
to long term security, stability and prosperity. These are the
characteristics of the sentinels in space.

